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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE MASSACHUSETTS PROCEDURE RELATIVE TO
THE SANITY OF DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES
(The Briggs Law)
By

F

WINFRED OVERHOLSER*

time to time a case arises in which the accused, generally
believed by the public to be guilty of some heinous and wellpublicized offense, enters a plea of insanity. Whether or not the
plea is sustained, psychiatric expert testimony is introduced by the
prosecution and defense which at least appears to be conflicting.
Thereupon editorials are written demanding "reform," perhaps
even urging abolition of the defense of insanity, and in any event
castigating severely the "venal" and "unprofessional" "experts."
Is is useless to tell the average man that the psychiatrists, thanks
to the hypothetical question and the rules of evidence, probably
seemed to disagree much more violently than they did in actuality;
that there are many kinds of experts, and that some of them (such
as real-estate experts) exhibit far greater discrepancies in their
testimony; or that the defendant has a constitutional right to summon witnesses in his own behalf; or that insanity existing at the
time of the act is a defense to crime recognized throughout England and the United States for many years. In short, there is a
widespread popular distrust of the "plea of insanity" and of psychiatric expert witnesses.
Several states, taking cognizance of this distrust, have made
attempts to improve matters. In California,1 for example, if the
plea of insanity is introduced, two trials are had, the first on the
facts and the second on the question of sanity, an arrangement
which complicates matters unduly and very likely does not conduce
substantially to a clearer ascertainment of the truth.2 Colorado3
provides that in the event the plea of insanity is introduced, the
court must commit the defendant to a state hospital for observation; this procedure appears to work well as far as it goes. MissisROM

*A.B., M.D.; Commissioner of Mental Diseases, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts; Lecturer, Boston University School of Law.
1
California, Penal Code, sec. 1016.
2
See dissent of Preston, J., in People v. Troche, (1928) 206 Cal. 35,
273 Pac. 767; and Shepherd, The Plea of Insanity under the 1927 Amendments to the California Penal Code, (1929) 3 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1.
SColorado, Acts 1927, ch. 90.
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sippi4 tried the abolition of the defense of insanity, but the statute
was declared unconstitutional.' Louisiana6 attempted to make a
commissioner's findings conclusive, but this act likewise was nullified by the supreme court of the state. The various procedures
adopted as a supposed means of reform have, in general, overlooked
a fundamental, namely, that the initiation of the plea of insanity
is left to some non-psychiatric personi-the defense attorney, the
jail officials, or the judge. Accordingly, there is no assurance that
mental disease, if present in the defendant, will be recognized.
There is no doubt that numerous defendants have been put on trial
and even convicted and sentenced who were at the time mentally
unsound; the inherent injustice of trying and convicting an insane
man is well recognized in the law from Blackstone down. One
other fundamental objection may be made to most of the prevailing
systems, namely, that once insanity is "recognized," machinery for
an impartial determination of the question is lacking, and partisans
must be introduced. Immediately the possibility of bias is injected
and this bias thoroughly discounted, so that indeed before the proceedings are over the evidence of the experts for both sides is
thrown out and the jury left to substitute that rather nebulous
thing, "common sense," for expert knowledge.
These preliminary remarks are intended to emphasize the significance of a Massachusetts procedure which obviates most of the
objections mentioned above, which has operated well, and which
received wide recognition as an extremely advanced step. In 1921,
Dr. L. Vernon Briggs of Boston, a psychiatrist of note, secured the
enactment of legislation conceived by him providing for the mental
examination by the State Department of Mental Diseases in advance of trial of (1) all persons indicted for a capital offense; (2)
all persons bound over or indicted who have been (a) previously
convicted of a felony or (b) indicted more than once for any
offense. These were the elements of the original act; four minor
amendments, having to do with details of the machinery, have
since been enacted, the last in 1929. The present law-- follows:
"Whenever a person is indicted by a grand jury for a capital
offense or whenever a person, who is known to have been indicted
for any other offense more than once or to have been previously
convicted of a felony, is indicted by a grand jury or bound over for
Mississippi, Acts 1928, ch. 75, secs. 1 and 2.
5
Sinclair v. State, (1931) 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581.
State v. Lange, (1929) 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639, invalidating Act No.

6

17, Extra
Session of 1928.
7

Massachusetts, General Laws, Tercentenary Ed., ch. 123, sec. 100A.
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trial in the superior court, the clerk of the court in which the
indictment is returned, or the clerk of the district court or the trial
justice, as the case may be, shall give notice to the department of
mental diseases, and the department shall cause such person to be
examined with a view to determine his mental condition and the
existence of any mental disease or defect which would affect his
criminal responsibility. Whenever the probation officer of such
court has in his possession or whenever the inquiry which he is
required to make by section eighty-five of chapter two hundred
and seventy-six discloses facts which if known to the clerk would
require notice as aforesaid, such probation officer shall forthwith
communicate the same to the clerk who shall thereupon give such
notice unless already given. The department shall file a report of
its investigation with the clerk of the court in which the trial is to
be held, and the report shall be accessible to the court, the probation
officer thereof, the district attorney and to the attorney for the
accused. In the event of failure by the clerk of a district court or
the trial justice to give notice to the department as aforesaid, the
same shall be given by the clerk of the superior court after entry
of the case in said court. Upon giving the notice required by this
section the clerk of a court of the trial justice shall so certify on
the papers. .

.

. Any clerk or trial justice who wilfully neglects to

perform any duty imposed upon him by this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than fifty dollars."
For obvious reasons, the statute is usually referred to as the
"Briggs Law," and is so indexed.
In the first place, then, the law applies to all defendants falling
within certain legal categories. It is doubtful whether even the
well developed psychiatric machinery of Massachusetts could examine all defendants in the criminal courts, so a limit had to be set.
This was done by describing in legal terms the groups which presumably include the more serious offenders. Parenthetically, it
may here be observed that under another statute8 any court of the
commonwealth may request a mental examination by a member of
the staff of a state hospital of "any person coming before the
court," 9 so that any defendant not affected by the Briggs Law may
be examined by the department if the court so desires. Also" ° the
court may employ experts or commit the defendant to a state
hospital if doubt arises as to his sanity either before trial or at any
time before final disposition. The examination under the Briggs
Law is made without reference to any "plea of insanity," contem8

Massachusetts, General Laws, Tercentenary Ed., ch. 123, sec. 99.
See article on this topic by Overholser in 16 Mass. L. Quart. (May,
1931) 26-34.
0
' Massachusetts, General Laws, Tercentenary Ed., ch. 123, sec. 100.
9
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plated or actual; indeed, in one case of a murderer who was definitely insane the man's own attorney was doubtful of the report,
and almost certainly would not have entered a defense of insanity
unless the examination had been made.
In the second place, the examination is impartial. The two
psychiatrists who make it are assigned by the Department of Mental Diseases, a professional department within the administrative
branch of government. They are in no sense court attachis, and
are employed neither by the district attorney nor by defense counsel. They are paid a fee of four dollars plus mileage of twenty
cents a mile one way, certainly not a sum large enough to raise any
suspicion of venality! Being appointed by psychiatrists, it is reasonable to suppose (as indeed is the fact) that they are competent,
an assurance which cannot always be given in the case of psychiatrists who are selected by a judge who cannot be expected to be
posted on the relative merits of medical men. The examiners being
neutral and competent, there is every reason why their report
should carry weight with court and jury. In the event that in
spite of a report to the effect that the defendant is sane the defense
insists upon introducing expert evidence to the contrary, the jury
is naturally likely to lean toward the view expressed by experts
who are not open to the suspicion of partisanship. That the members of the bar recognize that the examination is fairly made is
evident from the fact that almost never does an attorney refuse to
permit his client to submit to it. The report, although accessible
to the court, district attorney, defense counsel and probation officer, is advisory only, and is not admissible as evidence. The examiners, however, may be summoned by either the commonwealth or
the defense and asked their opinion and the grounds therefor. The
right of the defense to introduce further expert testimony is, of
course, not impaired, and in certain capital cases the expense of
such testimony has been paid by the county upon authorization of
the court, the defendant being impecunious.- Cases in which such
further testimony has been introduced have been extremely rare,
and it may properly be claimed for the Briggs Law that it has
almost entirely eradicated those "battles of experts" which have
done much to provoke criticism of the courts and of psychiatrists,
and which are still all too common in most jurisdictions.
"iThis procedure is discretionary with the trial justice. See Commonwealth v. Belenski, (1931) 276 Mass. 35, 176 N. E. 501: "Having been
examined by impartial experts the defendant was not entitled as of right
to a further examination at the public expense."
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The following synoptic table indicates some of the essential
data regarding the operation of the law:
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A few facts may be pointed out. First of all, of course, the
proportion of those defendants found to be clearly or suggestively
abnormal mentally is a sufficient refutation of the charge sometimes loosely made that the psychiatrists, if given a free hand,
would find all or most accused criminals insane. Although 16.91,
were found to exhibit deviations from normal, those reported to
have mental disease ("insanity") or to show symptoms suggestive
of it were only 5% of all examined. Some of the mental defectives
would be legally "insane," but many would meet the tests of responsibility, and in the group of "other mental abnormalities" would be
found such diagnoses as neurosis, alcoholism, epilepsy, and drug
addiction, some of which might or might not be considered as constituting criminal irresponsibility. The marked increase of cases
reported beginning in 1927 was due to the passage of an amendment in that year'12 placing upon the probation officer the duty of
reporting to the clerk the previous record of the defendant if it
rendered the latter examinable under the law. The steadily decreas12Massachusetts, Acts 1927, ch. 59, sec. 1.
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ing proportion of defendants reported but not examined is evidence
of the co6peration of the courts.
Of some interest may be found a tabulation of the offenses
charged against the defendants examined (in numerous cases, of
course, more than one indictment was found against the defendant).
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It need only be mentioned in connection with this table that the
marked increase in offenses other than homicide illustrates the progressive improvement in reporting which has taken place since
1927.
Having seen the nature of the reports, we may turn to the matter of disposition. In those cases in which the defendant is reported
to be "insane," the district attorney usually arranges to have him
committed to a mental hospital,' 3 where he is held until it is determined that he is sane, being then returned to court. More rarely,
in some homicide cases, the district attorney moves for a verdict
of "not guilty by reason of insanity"; such a verdict is merely a
formal one, following upon the minimum of uncontroverted testimony and consuming at the most an hour. The savings effected by
such celerity and economy of procedure, as compared with the traditional method of taking up several days with expensive and
perhaps conflicting testimony, have repaid every year and many
fold the trifling cost of the administration of the law, and at the
same time the treatment of the defendant has been much fairer.
In the event of acquittal of homicide "by reason of insanity" 1' the
prisoner must be committed to a mental hospital "during his natu13 Massachusetts, General Laws, Tercentenary Ed., ch. 123, sec. 100.
"4Massachusetts, General Laws, Tercentenary Ed., ch. 123, sec. 101.
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ral life," and may be released by the governor with the advice and
consent of the council if he is satisfied after an investigation by the
department (of Mental Diseases) that such discharge will not cause
danger to others. 15 If commitment for observation is advised by
the examiners, the district attorney usually arranges to have the
court commit him for a period of thirty-five days. If not "insane,"
he is returned to court; if suffering from mental disease, the court
may authorize his detention until restored to sanity. These procedures, except for the acquittal by reason of insanity, do not
require a jury, nor even sworn medical testimony. This relative
informality makes for the prompt and humane disposition of the
mentally ill defendant. During the three-year period ending October 15, 1933, all seventeen of the defendants reported to be "insane" were committed to a mental hospital. This is as it should be,
and indicates that the court not only waited for the report before
disposition, but acted upon it. The number of defendants committed for observation under that procedure was as follows: 1931,
13 out of 21 ; 1932, 16 out of 26; 1933, 16 out of 23. In some of
these cases, at least, the defendant was disposed of by a "no bill,"
a "nol. pros." filing of the case, or a verdict of "not guilty"; in a
few others he was sentenced to a penal institution or placed on
probation.
The disposition of the defendants reported as mentally defective was not so satisfactory from a psychiatric point of view.
During the three-year period just referred to, 210 defendants were
so reported, of whom 24, or 11.4%, were committed as defective
delinquents;"' 119, or 56.6%, were committed to the conventional
correctional or penal institutions; and 27, or 12.8%, were placed
on probation. One reason for the hesitation of some judges to
commit to the Department of Defective Delinquents is the fact
that that department is much overcrowded. A more potent reason,
however, is probably the feeling that commitment for an indeterminate period is an unduly severe disposition for what may be
looked upon as a "less serious" offense-a relic of the "classical"
theory of penology. Seemingly the day is not yet at hand when the
dangerousness of the offender and the rights of society are gen15 Massachusetts, General Laws, Tercentenary Ed., ch. 123, secs. 101, 105.
16 Massachusetts was the first (1911) to enact a defective delinquent
law, providing for the indefinite segregation in a separate department of
certain classes of mentally defective offenders. Massachusetts, General
Laws, Tercentenary Ed., ch. 123, sec. 113-124.
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erally considered as superior in importance to the name and supposed "seriousness" of the crime alleged.
The purpose of the statute has been well stated in the decision
of the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts in the case of the
Comnwnwealth v. Devereaux1 7 in 1926:

"The examination is required in order that no person so indicted may be put upon his trial unless his mental condition is
thereby determined to be such as to render him responsible to trial
and punishment for the crime charged against him, and that he
has no mental disease or defect which interferes with such criminal
responsibility. It is the duty imposed by the statute upon these
doctors and others similarly assigned by the Department of Mental
Diseases to say what is the mental condition of an accused and
whether he has any mental disease or defect affecting his criminal
responsibility.... It is a necessary deduction from all the circumstances that the defendant was put upon trial on the indictment
because the report of the Department of Mental Diseases upheld
his criminal responsibility. He would not have been brought to
trial without evidence of his mental condition if that report had not
been to the effect that he was of sufficient mental power to be criminally liable for his act and was not insane ....

Doubtless the judge

knew of this report at the trial.... He was justified in considering
it in connection with the motion for a new trial in the circumstances
here disclosed. . . The judge had a right to examine the cause
suggested in the motion for a new trial in the light of the contents
of this report, in order to aid him in ascertaining whether justice
required that there be a new trial."
In another part of the same decision the impartial nature of
the report was emphasized as follows:
"It is a matter of general knowledge that there are in the service of the commonwealth under this department persons eminent
for special scientific knowledge as to mental diseases. The examination under the statute, therefore, may fairly be assumed to have
been made by competent persons, free from any disposition or bias
and under every inducement to be impartial and to seek and ascertain the truth."
Judicial notice, then, is taken of the competence and impartiality of the examiners, and it is clearly indicated that the district
attorney is not expected to bring to trial a defendant who is not
pronounced to be sane and responsible. The figures already cited
indicate that the district attorneys have of late, at least, followed
the general lines laid down above. It is further stated that the
trial judge was guided by the report.
17(1926) 257 Mass. 391, 396, 397, 153 N. E. 881.
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In this connection a recent case of interest may be outlined.
In May, 1934, one S-,
with another, was indicted for breaking and entering and possessing burglarious implements. His case
was referred to the department, and the examiners reported him to
be probably insane, strongly advising that he be committed to a
state hospital for observation. When the case was called, the judge,
in spite of knowing of this report, ordered the case to trial. The
defendants were convicted, and thereupon Swas committed
to a state hospital. He was reported to be insane, and is still (October, 1934) in a state hospital for mental diseases. The attorney
then filed a motion for a new trial, citing the Devereaux decision
and arguing that his client should not have been put on trial. The
motion was allowed. Just what was gained by trying an insane
man it is hard to see; certainly it was not consistent with the principles of criminal procedure, and was distinctly unfair to the defenfant as well as being a waste of the court's time and the public's
money. The allowing of the new trial is a vindication of the Briggs
Law, and will undoubtedly serve to recall to the minds of other
judges the principles laid down in the Devereaux Case.18
The constitutionality of the Briggs Law has never been directly
decided, but there would appear to be no ground for questioning it.
A considerable number of writers on legal topics, notably Sheldon
Glueck,19 L. A. Tulin,2 0 and Henry Weihofen, 2 1 have expressed
interest in the Briggs Law, and approved of its principles. Weihofen, for example, states:
"The Massachusetts' 'Briggs Law' is almost the only practicable
recommendation looking to the sensible objective of sorting out the
insane and irresponsible offenders before going through the time
and money wasting process of a criminal trial." Glueck speaks of
it as "the
most farsighted piece of legislation yet passed on this
22
subject."
To summarize, the Briggs Law, by providing in advance of
18 Certain features of the Briggs Law have been cited in other decisions,
-Commonwealth v. Vallarelli, (1930) 273 Mass. 240, 173 N. E. 582;
Commonwealth v. Soaris, (1931) 275 Mass. 291, 175 N. E. 491; Harding
v. Commonwealth, (1933) 283 Mass. 369, 186 N. E. 556.
19S. Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law 55-56, 58-72,
474-476. Also, (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 632-648.
29Tulin, (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 933-963.
21Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law 401-407.
2
2A comprehensive study of the Briggs Law by the present author, with
full bibliography, has been accepted for early publication in the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology. The reader who may be interested in
features touched upon in the present article but not elaborated is respectfully referred thereto.
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trial an impartial and competent mental examination of certain
legal classes of persons accused of crime, has avoided the expense
of numerous costly trials; it has almost entirely eliminated the
"battles of experts" which have in the past brought discredit upon
psychiatric expert testimony; it has protected the rights of the
psychotic or otherwise mentally incompetent accused who might
otherwise have gone unrecognized; it has served in numerous cases
to indicate a disposition more in accord with the protection of
society and justice to the defendant than the usual mechanicallydetermined one based upon "classical" penological theories; finally,
it has aided in the process of educating judges, prosecutors, and the
bar to a realization of the service which psychiatry can render to
the individualization of justice. It is no exaggeration to say that
the Briggs Law represents the most significant step yet taken
toward a harmonious union of psychiatry with the criminal law.

